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1 Introduction
The idea of Nominal GDP Targeting (NGDPT) was introduced in Economics by Meade
(1978) and Tobin (1980). But since the 1990s, it was eclipsed by the Taylor Rule since
the introduction of this latter notion by Taylor (1993). Ever since, most of the Central
Banks in the Developed and Emerging Countries have implemented the Taylor Rule in
one of its many variants as demonstrated by many of the DSGE models that are built in
these institutions and the academic literature that followed. However, when the Great
Recession of 2008 struck, many voices advocated for alternative Monetary Policy Rules
and Practices. Among them, the Blog Posts by Scott Sumner attracted the support of
many Economists and the Economic Press. He resuscitated the view point of NGDPT
which is summarized in Sumner and Roberts (2018).
Motyovszki (2013) is one of the firstworks analyzing the concept ofNGDPT in aDSGE
model framework. He analyzes the issue in the setting of a New Keynesian DSGEmodel
containing three shocks and no zero lower bound. His results show that Nominal GDP
Level Targeting gives a steadier real economy than strict inflation targeting at the cost of
higher inflation volatility. He also finds that Nominal GDP Level Targeting accomplishes
better outcomes in terms of inflation and output gap volatility relative to a flexible Taylor
Rule characterized by situations where inflation targets can momentarily be missed. In
light of his results, he sums up by arguing that Nominal GDP Level Targeting might
deserve to be taken as an alternative tool for Monetary Policy Analysis.
Benchimol and Fourc¸ans (2016) employ a Bayesian method to estimate the Smets
and Wouters (2007) DSGE model using nine distinct Monetary Policy Rules on a USA
dataset from 1955 to 2015 and with three distinct sub-periods. Their results illustrate
the supremacy of the Nominal GDP Level Targeting Rules compared to the Taylor Rules
over all considered periods if we take into account only the loss function of the Central
Bank. Nevertheless, they discover that the objectives of the Central Bank are not always
satisfied by one rule for all the considered periods if we take other criteria into account.
Beckworth and Hendrickson (2016) utilize a New Keynesian DSGE model to sup-
pose that the Central Bank has imperfect information concerning the output gap and
consequently have to forecast this variable on the knowledge of past information. They
stipulate that the forecast errorsmade by the Central Bank can possibly cause unexpected
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variations of the short-run nominal interest rate that are different from a usual Monetary
Policy shock. Their results illustrate that forecast errors made by the Federal Reserve can
cause, at most, 13% of the changes in the output gap. Their findings also demonstrate
that, in the context of imperfect information, a Nominal GDP Targeting Rule might yield
lesser instability in both the output gap and inflation compared to a Taylor Rule.
Garin, Lester and Sims (2016) use a New Keynesian DSGEmodel with both price and
wage rigidity to examine the welfare characteristics of Nominal GDP Targeting. They
contrast a Taylor Rule, output gap and inflation targeting, and NGDPT. Output gap
targeting is the most suitable rule. NGDPT is almost as good as output gap targeting.
NGDPT is characterized by minor welfare losses than inflation targeting and a Taylor
Rule. In the presence of supply shocks and when wages are rigid compared to prices,
NGDPT beats a Taylor Rule and inflation targeting. If the output gap is observed with
errors, NGDPT could leave behind output gap targeting. NGDPTpossessesmorewanted
equilibrium determinacy characteristics than output gap targeting.
Similarly to the works cited above, this paper studies the concept of NGDPT in a
New Keynesian DSGE model framework. Compared to previous works on NGDPT, it
makes numerous contributions. First, our DSGE model formulation, that is to say the
model specification, is different from previous studies on NGDPT. Second, we introduce
and estimate real wages rigidities. Third, our model contains a government sector with
a slightly different formulation. Fourth, the specification of our Nominal GDP Targeting
Rule is different. Fifth, our work is the first to use the newly invented Hamilton Filter,
Hamilton (2018)1, to compute the observable variables of our model. Sixth, this study is
the first to perform a Bayesian DSGEModel Comparison of the Taylor Rule and Nominal
GDP Targeting. Seventh, our research is the first to conduct a Bayesian DSGE Model
Comparison of the Taylor Rule and Nominal GDP Targeting on Euro Area data. Our
Bayesian DSGEModel Comparison results attribute a PosteriorModel Probability of 0.00
to the Taylor Rule and a PosteriorModel Probability of 1.00 to theNominalGDPTargeting
Rule. Our estimation results also give a Bayes Ratio of 1.00 to the Taylor Rule and a Bayes
Ratio of 6.17 × 1098 to the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. These results demonstrate that
1For the interested reader, I introduce a new Stata User-Written command named “hamiltonfilter” that
Calculates the Hamilton Filter for a Single Time Series or for a Panel Dataset. The command is downloadable
at: https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458449.html. Please, see this website for more details.
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the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is overwhelmingly preferred by the Euro Area data
than the Taylor Rule. We also ran numerous robustness checks that corroborate these
results.
The remaining of the paper is organized in the following manner: the first section
presents the theoretical model, the second section exposes the empirical investigations
and the last part concludes.
4
2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we expose the theoretical model and illustrate how the main equations
are obtained.
2.1 Households
The model presumes identical individuals, meaning that they have similar preference
parameters. Therefore, we can employ the representative-agent hypothesis within which
the analysis is done from the decisions of one agent. The household maximizes the
expected value of the present value of his lifetime utility function2 subject to some
constraints and the initial value of capital stock. His optimization program is given by:
Max
{Bt,ct,ivt,kt+1,lt}
∞
t=0
E0

∞∑
t=0
βtat
(
ct
1−θ − 1
1 − θ
−
ζ lt
1+η
1 + η
) (1)
Subject to:
ct + ivt + 1/2φk
(
ivt
kt
− δ
)2
kt +
Bt
Ptrt
=
Qtkt +Wtlt + Bt−1 +Dt
Pt
− τt (2)
kt+1 = (1 − δ) kt + xtivt (3)
In the equations above, we have:
ln (at) = ρa ln (at−1) + εa,t (4)
ln (xt) = ρx ln (xt−1) + εx,t (5)
In expression (1), the household chooses bonds Bt, consumption ct, investment ivt,
next period physical capital stock kt+1 and labor lt to maximize this objective function
given the constraints he faces. Equation (2) says that the household gets his income from
supplying capitalQtkt, supplying laborWtlt, bonds holding Bt−1 and receiving dividends
Dt. His income is expressed in real term by dividing by the price level Pt. To obtain
his disposable income, he deducts his previous real income from lump-sum taxes τt.
The household uses his disposable income to pay for consumption ct, investment ivt,
investment adjustment costs 1/2φk
(
ivt
kt
− δ
)2
kt and new bonds
Bt
Ptrt
, all expressed in real
terms. The investment adjustment costs function employed in this study has been also
2The agent lives forever.
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utilized by Ireland (2003) and Roehe (2012). Equality (3) is the law of motion of capital
stock. Equations (4) and (5) represent the intertemporal preference shock and the shock
to the marginal efficiency of investment respectively. In equality (2), rt is the short-
run nominal gross interest rate and in the objective function (1), E0 (·) is the Rational
Expectations Operator using all available information. In the expressions above, we have
the following conditions for the parameters and the remaining variables: 0 < β < 1; 0 < θ;
0 ≤ η; 0 < ζ; 0 < ρa < 1; εa,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2a
)
; 0 ≤ φk; 0 < δ < 1; 0 < ρx < 1; εx,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2x
)
.
The First-OrderConditions for the householdproblemgive us the following equations
with λt and ψt, the Lagrange multipliers of equations (2) and (3) respectively:
First-Order Conditions with respect to ct:
at
ctθ
− λt = 0 (6)
First-Order Conditions with respect to lt:
− atζ lt
η
+
λtWt
Pt
= 0 (7)
Combining equations (6) and (7), allows us to write the equation for real wages
rigidity as it is done in Blanchard and Gali (2007) and Ascari and Rossi (2011) with
0 ≤ γ < 1.
Wt
Pt
=
(
Wt−1
Pt−1
)γ (
ct
θζ lt
η
)1−γ
(8)
First-Order Conditions with respect to Bt:
−
λt
Ptrt
+ Et
(
βλt+1
Pt+1
)
= 0 (9)
First-Order Conditions with respect to kt+1:
−ψt−Et
1/2
((
δ2Pt+1φk − 2Qt+1
)
kt+1
2 − Pt+1ivt+1
2φk
)
βλt+1
kt+1
2Pt+1
−Et
(
βψt+1 (δ − 1)
)
= 0 (10)
First-Order Conditions with respect to ivt:
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λt
(
δ ktφk − ivtφk − kt
)
kt
+ ψtxt = 0 (11)
2.2 Firms
In this section, we will analyze the decisions of the final good firm and the intermediate
goods firms.
2.2.1 Final Good Firm
The profit maximization problem of the final good firm is given by:
Max
yt(i)
Πt = Pt
(∫ 1
0
(
yt (i)
) ν−1
ν di
) ν
ν−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pt (i) yt (i) di (12)
In equation (12), yt =
(∫ 1
0
(
yt (i)
) ν−1
ν di
) ν
ν−1
is the final good, yt (i) are the differentiated
intermediate goods and Pt (i) are the prices of the intermediate goods. We have 1 <
ν. Maximizing expression (12) with respect to yt (i), doing lots of simplifications and
substitutions, we find:
yt (i) = yt
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ν
(13)
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
(Pt (i))
−ν+1 di
) 1
−ν+1
(14)
Equation (13)means that the demand for the intermediate good i, yt (i), is proportional
to the final good yt and is a function of its relative price
Pt(i)
Pt
, where ν is the price elasticity
of demand. Equation (14) indicates that the final good price Pt is a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) aggregator function of the prices of the intermediate goods Pt (i).
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
The optimization problem of the intermediate goods firms is:
Max
{Pt(i),kt(i),lt(i)}
∞
t=0
E0

∞∑
t=0
βtλtDt (i)
Pt
 (15)
Subject to:
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yt (i) = (kt (i))
α (ztlt (i))
1−α (16)
yt (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ν
yt (17)
In the equations above, we have:
Dt (i)
Pt
=
Pt (i) yt (i)
Pt
−
Wtlt (i) +Qtkt (i)
Pt
− 1/2φP
(
Pt (i)
piPt−1 (i)
− 1
)2
yt (18)
ln (zt) =
(
1 − ρz
)
ln (z) + ρz ln (zt−1) + εz,t (19)
In expression (15), the intermediate goods firm i chooses price Pt (i), capital stock
kt (i) and labor lt (i) to maximize this objective function given the constraints it faces.
Equation (18) are the dividends in real terms. In this equality, 1/2φP
(
Pt(i)
piPt−1(i)
− 1
)2
yt are
the quadratic adjustment costs of the nominal price Pt (i). This concept was introduced
by Rotemberg (1982). Equation (16) is the Cobb-Douglas production function of the
intermediate goods firm i and equality (17) represents the demand for the intermediate
good i. The technology shock is provided by equation (19). In the expressions above, we
have the following conditions for the parameters and the remaining variables: 0 < α < 1;
0 ≤ φP; 0 < z; 0 < ρz < 1; εz,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
.
The First-Order Conditions for the intermediate goods firm i problem give us the
following equations with ϑt, the Lagrange multiplier of equation (16), after substituting
equality (17) in equations (16) and (18) respectively:
First-Order Conditions with respect to lt (i):
−
λtWt
Pt
+ ϑt (kt (i))
α zt (ztlt (i))
−α (1 − α) = 0 (20)
First-Order Conditions with respect to kt (i):
−
λtQt
Pt
+ ϑt (kt (i))
−1+α α ztlt (i) (ztlt (i))
−α
= 0 (21)
First-Order Conditions with respect to Pt (i):
(22)
−
λtyt
Ptpi2 (Pt−1 (i))
2
(
pi2 (Pt−1 (i))
2 (ν − 1)
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ν
− PtφP (piPt−1 (i) − Pt (i))
)
+
ϑtν yt
Pt (i)
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ν
+ Et
(
βλt+1φP (−piPt (i) + Pt+1 (i)) yt+1Pt+1 (i)
pi2 (Pt (i))
3
)
= 0
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First-Order Conditions with respect to ϑt:
−
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ν
yt + (kt (i))
α (ztlt (i))
1−α
= 0 (23)
2.3 Government
The Government (Fiscal Authority) runs a balanced budget in each period. That is, we
have:
τt = gt (24)
Where τt are the lump-sum taxes and gt are the General Government final consump-
tion expenditures. The Government consumes in each period, a stochastic share of
output. Thus, we have:
gt = ξtyt (25)
Where yt is output and ξt is the shock to Government expenditures given by the
following equation:
ln (ξt) =
(
1 − ρξ
)
ln (ξ) + ρξ ln (ξt−1) + εξ,t (26)
In this last equation, the following conditions stand for the parameters and the remain-
ing variables: 0 < ξ; 0 < ρξ < 1; εξ,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2
ξ
)
. Although, there is no Fiscal Authority
for the Euro Area as a hole, we use the setting above as an approximate representation of
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Agreement in Europe. This assumption of budget
equilibrium has also been used by Adolfson, Lase´en, Linde´ and Villani (2007) in a DSGE
model for the Euro Area albeit with a different specification.
2.4 Monetary Authority
In this section, we set the two Monetary Policy Rules that we will compare: a modified
Taylor Rule, as in Roehe (2012) and the references therein, and a Nominal GDP Level
Targeting Rule. The Nominal GDP Level Targeting Rule specification has not been used
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before and represents one of the contributions of the current paper. The modified Taylor
Rule is given by the following equations:
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρrtr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+
(
1 − ρrtr
) (
φpitr ln
(
pit
pi
)
+ φytr ln
(
yt
y
))
+ ln
(
µtr,t
)
(27)
ln
(
µtr,t
)
= ρµtr ln
(
µtr,t−1
)
+ εµtr,t (28)
Equation (27), says that theCentral Bankprogressively changes the short-run nominal
gross interest rate rt in reaction to deviations of current gross inflation pit and output yt
from their respective steady state amounts. Equality (28) is the Taylor Rule Monetary
Policy shock process. In these two equations above, we have the following conditions for
the parameters and the remaining variables: 0 < ρrtr < 1; 0 < φpitr; 0 ≤ φytr; 0 < ρµtr < 1;
εµtr,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2µtr
)
. The Nominal GDP Level Targeting Rule is provided by the following
equations:
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρrng ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+
(
1 − ρrng
)
φfng ln
(
Ft
F
)
+ ln
(
µng,t
)
(29)
ln
(
µng,t
)
= ρµng ln
(
µng,t−1
)
+ εµng,t (30)
Ft = Ptyt (31)
Equation (29), says that theCentral Bankprogressively changes the short-run nominal
gross interest rate rt in reaction to deviations of current Nominal GDP Ft from its steady
state amount. Equality (30) is the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule Monetary Policy shock
process. Equation (31) defines the Nominal GDP Level Ft as the product of the GDP
Deflator Pt and Real GDP yt. In these equations above, we have the following conditions
for the parameters and the remaining variables: 0 < ρrng < 1; 0 < φfng; 0 < ρµng < 1;
εµng,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2µng
)
.
2.5 Equilibrium Conditions of the Models
To find the equilibrium conditions of the two models, we first invoke the symmetric
equilibrium statement in which all Intermediate Goods Firms make similar choices.
Then, we apply the market clearing hypothesis on the goods and bond markets. Finally,
we express all nominal quantities in real terms by dividing by the appropriate price.
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After this, we compute the steady states of themodels3 and log-linearize themodels. The
log-linearized equations of the two models are given in appendix A for completeness
purposes.
3 Empirical Investigations
This section presents the estimationmethods, the data and variables, and the econometric
results.
3.1 Estimation Methods
Following Koop (2003), we will briefly summarize the concepts of Bayesian Estimation
and Bayesian Model Comparison. The Bayesian estimation of our DSGE model can be
written as:
p(θ|y) =
p(y|θ)p(θ)
p(y)
(32)
Where θ are the parameters of our DSGE model; y are the data; p(θ|y) is the posterior
density; p(y|θ) is the likelihood function; p(θ) is the prior density and p(y) is the marginal
distribution of y. Since p(y) is not a function of the parameters θ, we can express equation
(32) as:
p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ) (33)
Equation (33) is essential in Bayesian estimation. It says that the posterior distribution
of model parameters is proportional to the likelihood function times the prior probability
distribution.
For Bayesian Model Comparison, suppose that we want to compare r models Mi
with parameters θi, i = 1, . . . , r. Using Bayes’s rule, we can write the posterior model
probability as:
p
(
Mi| y
)
=
p
(
y |Mi
)
p (Mi)
p(y)
(34)
3The steady states of the models are available upon request.
11
Where p
(
Mi| y
)
is the posterior model probability; p
(
y |Mi
)
is the marginal likelihood
or the marginal density or the marginal data density; p (Mi) is the prior model probability
and p(y) is the marginal distribution of y. Given that p(y) is tedious to compute, we can
usually compare twomodels,Mi andM j, by calculating the ratio of their posterior model
probabilities which gives us the posterior odds ratio POij, defined as:
POij =
p
(
Mi| y
)
p
(
M j
∣∣∣ y) =
p
(
y |Mi
)
p (Mi)
p
(
y
∣∣∣M j ) p (M j) (35)
If
p(Mi)
p(M j)
= 1 or if p (Mi) = p
(
M j
)
, the posterior odds ratio reduces to the ratio of
marginal likelihoods. It then takes a specific designation called the Bayes factor or the
Bayes ratio BFij, as described by the following formula:
BFij =
p
(
y |Mi
)
p
(
y
∣∣∣M j ) (36)
Bayesian computation of DSGE models involves calculating integrals. In most cases,
these integrals do not have a closed-form analytical solution. To solve this problem, we
turn to simulation methods like the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) Algorithm to get random draws from the posterior distribution. To
perform the Bayesian computations of ourDSGEmodels, we employ the softwareDynare
as described in Adjemian, Bastani, Juillard, Karame´, Maih, Mihoubi, Perendia, Pfeifer,
Ratto and Villemot (2011).
3.2 Data and Variables
For our estimations and models comparison exercises, we employ seasonally adjusted
quarterly Euro Area data from 1987Q1 to 2007Q4. We focus on the Great Moderation
Period in the Euro Area to avoid complications arising from the other high volatility peri-
ods of the business cycle. All the data come from the Area-Wide Model (AWM) database
(Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2005)). The parameters that characterize the steady-sates of
the two models are calibrated and taken from the literature. The remaining parame-
ters are estimated with their prior values also taken from the literature. Following the
tradition of DSGE model estimation in Dynare, the priors for the estimated parameters
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are selected according to the subsequent guidelines: gamma distribution for parameters
that are required to be positive; inverse gamma distribution for the standard deviation
of the shocks; beta distribution for parameters that must be between 0 and 1, and normal
distribution for all the remaining parameters. We have five observed endogenous vari-
ables: real GDP, real investment, inflation, short-term interest rate and real wages. Real
GDP and real investment are computed in per capita values. All variables are logged
using the natural logarithm and filtered utilizing the Hamilton Filter (Hamilton (2018)).
Hamilton (2018) gives the criticisms of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter and explains why the
Hamilton Filter is a superior alternative. The use of the Hamilton Filter is one of the
main contributions of the current paper because it has not been employed before in all
the literature of DSGE modeling. The issue of stochastic singularity is circumvented in
our case because the number of observed variables is equal to the number of structural
shocks in our DSGE models.
3.3 Bayesian Estimation Results
In this part, we will present the main estimation results, the Bayesian DSGE model
comparison results, the impulse response functions study and the robustness analysis.
3.3.1 Main Estimation Results
Figures 1 and 2 show the multivariate convergence diagnostic of the MH sampling
algorithm for the Taylor Rule and the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule respectively4. The
results are synthesized in three graphics panels, where each panel exhibits a particular
convergence measurement and containing two different lines representing the results
within and between chains. These measurements are associated to the investigation
of the parameters first central moments (indicated by interval), the parameters second
central moments (indicated by m2) and the parameters third central moments (indicated
by m3). In each of the three graphics panels, in order to obtain good results, the two
lines ought to stabilize horizontally and must be near to each other. For the two figures
representing the two Monetary Policy Rules, we observe that general convergence is
4Univariate convergence diagnostics are available upon request, but are not reported due to space con-
straints.
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accomplished, for all the three moments under examination, both within and between
chains. But we notice that the MH sampling algorithm for the Nominal GDP Targeting
Rule have converged more than the Taylor Rule. This, because the Taylor Rule takes
longer to converge than the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 display the priors and posteriors for the parameters of the Taylor
Rule while Figures 6 and 7 exhibit the priors and posteriors for the parameters of the
Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. In each of these graphics, the green vertical line designates
the posteriormode resulting from themaximization of the posterior kernel. The black line
specifies the posterior distribution whereas the grey line represents the prior probability
density function. For the twoMonetary Policy Rules, except few parameters, we observe
that for most of the parameters, the mode resulting from maximization coincides with
the mode of the posterior distribution obtained from the MH algorithm. For the majority
of parameters, we notice that the shapes of the prior and posterior distributions are not
excessively distant from each other, for the two Monetary Policy Rules. For these latter
Rules, we see that the outcomes are not exclusively prior driven, because the prior and
posterior distributions are practically different formost parameters. This put forward that
the observed data do offer supplementary information in updating the prior information
in our Bayesian estimations. The patterns of the posterior distributions are nearly normal,
conforming with the asymptotic properties of Bayesian estimation.
Table 1 gives the Bayesian estimation results for the Taylor Rule. The first column
of the table gives the parameters, the second big column exhibits the information on the
prior distribution: type, mean and standard deviation. The third big column provides
the information on the posterior distribution: mode, standard deviation, mean and 90%
highest posterior density (HPD) interval. The bottom of the table exposes information
about additional statistics. We performed 100000 draws to ensure convergence of theMH
Algorithm. We obtained a Log Marginal Data Density of 499.949. The Acceptance Rate
per chain are also reasonable because they both do not exceed 50% and are not too small.
In addition, we checked that the rank condition is verified. All coefficients are statistically
significant, are in the intervals in which they were supposed to be as set in the theoretical
model, are plausible and moreover keep their expected signs. Most of the parameters
are estimated with a high degree of precision because the standard deviations of their
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posterior distributions are very small. The output elasticity of capital α is greater than the
value of 0.333 typically used in calibrated DSGEmodels. This suggests that α is bigger in
the Euro Area. The implied Frisch intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply
1/η = 2.031 is greater than 1. Real wages are mildly rigid in the Euro Area according to
the Taylor Rulemodel as illustrated by the value of γ. The implied constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption 1/θ = 0.405 is smaller than 1 and is closer to the
value employed in the Economic Growth literature. The value of the price adjustment
cost parameter φP suggests that nominal prices are rigid in the Euro Area and this result
is near to what have been found in the DSGE models literature. Turning to Monetary
Policy parameters, we observe that the smoothing parameter of the nominal interest rate
ρrtr is very small. We notice that the European Central Bank respond aggressively to an
increase in output and inflation relative to their steady state values as suggested by the
quantities of φytr and φpitr respectively. The value of the investment adjustment costs
parameter φk indicates that there are investment adjustment costs in the Euro Area. The
autocorrelation parameters for the shock processes of the Monetary Policy Rule shock
ρµtr, the intertemporal preference shock ρa, the shock to Government expenditures share
ρξ and the technology shock ρz are all very high, illustrating that the corresponding shock
processes are very persistent. Contrarily, the shock process to the marginal efficiency of
investment is not persistent as shown by the value of ρx. The previous results for the
autocorrelation parameters also demonstrate a sign of the nonexistence of unit roots in
these processes. Finishing with the estimated standard deviations, we observe that none
of the shocks processes are too volatile.
Table 2 gives the Bayesian estimation results for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule.
The first column of the table gives the parameters, the second big column exhibits the
information on the prior distribution: type, mean and standard deviation. The third
big column provides the information on the posterior distribution: mode, standard
deviation, mean and 90% highest posterior density (HPD) interval. The bottom of the
table exposes information about additional statistics. We performed 100000 draws to
ensure convergence of the MH Algorithm. We obtained a Log Marginal Data Density
of 643.176. The Acceptance Rate per chain are also reasonable because they both do not
exceed 50% and are not too small. In addition, we checked that the rank condition is
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verified. All coefficients are statistically significant, are in the intervals in which they
were supposed to be as set in the theoretical model, are plausible and moreover keep
their expected signs. Most of the parameters are estimatedwith a high degree of precision
because the standarddeviations of their posterior distributions are very small. The output
elasticity of capital α is greater than the value of 0.333 typically used in calibrated DSGE
models. This suggests that α is bigger in the Euro Area. The implied Frisch intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply 1/η = 2.134 is greater than 1. Realwages are rigid
in the EuroArea according to theNominalGDPTargetingRulemodel as illustrated by the
value of γ. The implied constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
1/θ = 0.398 is smaller than 1 and is closer to the value employed in the Economic Growth
literature. The value of the price adjustment cost parameter φP suggests that nominal
prices are rigid in the Euro Area and this result is near to what have been found in the
DSGE models literature. Turning to Monetary Policy parameters, we observe that the
smoothing parameter of the nominal interest rate ρrng is very small. We notice that the
European Central Bank respond aggressively to an increase in Nominal GDP relative to
its steady state value as suggested by the quantity of φfng. The value of the investment
adjustment costs parameter φk indicates that there are investment adjustment costs in
the Euro Area. The autocorrelation parameters for the shock processes of the Monetary
Policy Rule shock ρµng, the intertemporal preference shock ρa, the shock to Government
expenditures share ρξ and the technology shock ρz are all very high, illustrating that
the corresponding shock processes are very persistent. Contrarily, the shock process
to the marginal efficiency of investment is not persistent as shown by the value of ρx.
The previous results for the autocorrelation parameters also demonstrate a sign of the
nonexistence of unit roots in these processes. Finishing with the estimated standard
deviations, we observe that none of the shocks processes are too volatile.
3.3.2 Bayesian DSGEModel Comparison Results
Table 3 gives the Bayesian model comparison results with equal prior probability distri-
bution to the two monetary policy rules models. The first column shows information on
the following statistics: Priors, Log Marginal Density, Bayes Ratio and Posterior Model
Probability. The second column displays the statistics for the Taylor Rule while the third
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column exhibits the statistics for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. In this table, we
have equal priors for the two competing models. The log marginal density or the log
marginal likelihood or the log marginal data density for the Nominal GDP Targeting
Rule is larger than that of the Taylor Rule. The Bayes ratio or the Bayes factor demon-
strates that there is extreme evidence for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. The posterior
model probability for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is 1.000 and the posterior model
probability for the Taylor Rule is 0.000. This illustrates that the Nominal GDP Targeting
Rule have more chance of occurring than the Taylor Rule. All these statistics previously
examined go in the same direction. They all show that the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
is overwhelmingly preferred by the Euro Area data than the Taylor Rule.
Table 4 gives the Bayesian model comparison results with a bigger prior probability
attributed to the Taylor Rule than the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. The first column
shows information on the following statistics: Priors, Log Marginal Density, Bayes Ratio
and Posterior Model Probability. The second column displays the statistics for the Taylor
Rule while the third column exhibits the statistics for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule.
In this table, we have a bigger prior probability attributed to the Taylor Rule model than
the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule model. The log marginal density or the log marginal
likelihood or the log marginal data density for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is larger
than that of the Taylor Rule. The Bayes ratio or the Bayes factor demonstrates that there is
extreme evidence for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. The posterior model probability
for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is 1.000 and the posterior model probability for the
Taylor Rule is 0.000. This illustrates that the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule have more
chanceof occurring than theTaylorRule. All these statistics previously examinedgo in the
same direction. They all show that the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is overwhelmingly
preferred by the Euro Area data than the Taylor Rule.
Table 5 gives the Bayesian model comparison results with a bigger prior probability
attributed to the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule than the Taylor Rule. The first column
shows information on the following statistics: Priors, Log Marginal Density, Bayes Ratio
and Posterior Model Probability. The second column displays the statistics for the Taylor
Rule while the third column exhibits the statistics for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule.
In this table, we have a bigger prior probability attributed to the Nominal GDP Targeting
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Rule model than the Taylor Rule model. The log marginal density or the log marginal
likelihood or the log marginal data density for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is larger
than that of the Taylor Rule. The Bayes ratio or the Bayes factor demonstrates that there is
extreme evidence for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. The posterior model probability
for the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is 1.000 and the posterior model probability for the
Taylor Rule is 0.000. This illustrates that the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule have more
chanceof occurring than theTaylorRule. All these statistics previously examinedgo in the
same direction. They all show that the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is overwhelmingly
preferred by the Euro Area data than the Taylor Rule.
3.3.3 Impulse Response Functions Study
Figure 8 provides the impulse response functions to Monetary Policy Shocks where the
estimated parameters are updated to the posterior mean. The red line shows the x-axis,
the green dashed line represents the Taylor Rule and the blue solid line designates the
Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. We only exhibit the impact on the following variables
of interest: output, consumption, investment, labor, interest rate, inflation, real wage,
government spending and the shock processes for the two Monetary Policy Rules. A
positive temporary shock to Monetary Policy cause the Taylor Rule shock process to
increase more than that of the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule shock process. This is why
the impact on all the remaining variables of interest is larger for the Taylor Rule than the
Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. A positive Monetary Policy shock engenders a fall in all
the remaining variables of interest for both Rules. We observe that the effects of the two
Monetary Policy Rules go in the same directions, although the impact of the Taylor Rule is
more pronounced than that of theNominal GDPTargeting Rule as previouslymentioned.
This illustrates that our specification of the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is not wrong
becauseour specification is capable of giving similar results as the alreadywell established
Taylor Rule. All the variables of interest return to their steady state equilibriumafter some
time for the two Monetary Policy Rules, strengthening the statement given by the rank
and the Blanchard-Kahn conditions that the models are definitely stable.
18
3.3.4 Robustness Analysis
Table 6 gives the Robustness of the Bayesian model comparison results with equal prior
probability distribution to the twomonetary policy rules models. To obtain these results,
we have changed the prior probability distribution of the parameter φfng from a Gamma
distribution to a Normal distribution. As in the main results tables, here also we observe
that all the statistics go in the same direction. They all show that the Nominal GDP
Targeting Rule is overwhelmingly preferred by the Euro Area data than the Taylor Rule.
Tables 7 and 8 provides the Robustness of the Bayesian model comparison results
with a bigger prior probability attributed to the Taylor Rule than the Nominal GDP
Targeting Rule and a bigger prior probability attributed to the Nominal GDP Targeting
Rule than the Taylor Rule respectively. In all the previous Bayesian model comparison
results tables, the calculations were based on the Laplace approximation. In tables 7
and 8, the computations are based on the Modified Harmonic Mean Estimator. As in the
main results tables, here also we observe that all the statistics go in the same direction for
tables 7 and 8. They all show that the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is overwhelmingly
preferred by the Euro Area data than the Taylor Rule.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we carry out a comparison of the Taylor Rule and Nominal GDP Targeting
by estimating a DSGE model with Bayesian techniques. The theoretical part builds a
New Keynesian DSGE model with investment adjustment costs, prices and real wages
rigidities, a government sector, and imperfect competition, alongside various shocks.
The empirical part estimates and contrasts the models using Bayesian methods on Euro
Area data. Our Bayesian DSGE Model Comparison results attribute a Posterior Model
Probability of 0.00 to the Taylor Rule and a Posterior Model Probability of 1.00 to the
Nominal GDP Targeting Rule. Our estimation results also give a Bayes Ratio of 1.00 to
the Taylor Rule and a Bayes Ratio of 6.17×1098 to theNominal GDPTargeting Rule. These
results demonstrate that the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule is overwhelmingly preferred
by the Euro Area data than the Taylor Rule. We also ran numerous robustness checks
that corroborate these results.
Though the results foundwere informative, some extensions could bemade. First, we
compare only two models instead of many models. Second, it would be good to extend
our study using USA data in addition to Euro Area data. These avenues of research are
left for our future studies.
From economic policy perspectives, the results illustrate that Nominal GDP Targeting
is strongly supported by the data. Hence, it represents a viable and solid alternative to
the Taylor Rule and it should be considered by Central Bankers around the World.
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A The Log-Linearized Models Equations
Log-linearization is a mean of transforming the stochastic dynamic nonlinear equations
to stochastic dynamic linear equations. This makes the calculations and interpretations
easier. A hat over a variable approximately indicates percentage deviation of the variable
around the steady-state. The log-linearized equations of the two models are given by:
xˆt = ρxxˆt−1 + εx,t (37)
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + εa,t (38)
zˆt = ρzzˆt−1 + εz,t (39)
µˆng,t = ρµngµˆng,t−1 + εµng,t (40)
µˆtr,t = ρµtrµˆtr,t−1 + εµtr,t (41)
ξˆt = ρξξˆt−1 + εξ,t (42)
λˆt = −θ cˆt + aˆt (43)
wˆt =
(
−ηγ + η
)
lˆt +
(
−γθ + θ
)
cˆt + γ wˆt−1 (44)
− λˆt + rˆt + Et(λˆt+1) − Et(pˆit+1) = 0 (45)
Et(λˆt+1)
(
1 + (−1 + δ) β
)
β
+ δ2φkEt(iˆvt+1) − δ
2φkkˆt+1
− (−1 + δ)Et(ψˆt+1) +
Et(qˆt+1)
(
1 + (−1 + δ) β
)
β
−
ψˆt
β
= 0
(46)
− δ iˆvtφk + δφkkˆt + ψˆtx + x xˆt − λˆt = 0 (47)
y yˆt = k δ iˆvt + c cˆt + g gˆt (48)
gˆt = ξˆt + yˆt (49)
kˆt+1 = (1 − δ) kˆt + x δ iˆvt + x δ xˆt (50)
d dˆt = −k kˆtq − k q qˆt − l lˆtw − l w wˆt + y yˆt (51)
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− ϑˆt − yˆt + lˆt + wˆt + λˆt = 0 (52)
ϑˆt + yˆt − qˆt − λˆt − kˆt = 0 (53)
− φPpˆit − λˆt (ν − 1) + (ν − 1) ϑˆt + βφPEt(pˆit+1) = 0 (54)
yˆt = α kˆt + (1 − α) lˆt + (1 − α) zˆt (55)
rˆt = −φytr
(
ρrtr − 1
)
yˆt − φpitr
(
ρrtr − 1
)
pˆit + ρrtrrˆt−1 + µˆtr,t (56)
nˆt = yˆt − lˆt (57)
rˆt = −
(
−1 + ρrng
) (
yˆt + Pˆt
)
φfng + ρrngrˆt−1 + µˆng,t (58)
Pˆt = Pˆt−1 + pˆit (59)
B Graphics and Tables of Results
Figure 1: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic: Taylor Rule
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Figure 2: Multivariate Convergence Diagnostic: Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
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Figure 3: Priors and Posteriors for the Parameters: Taylor Rule, Part 1
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Figure 4: Priors and Posteriors for the Parameters: Taylor Rule, Part 2
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Figure 5: Priors and Posteriors for the Parameters: Taylor Rule, Part 3
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Figure 6: Priors and Posteriors for the Parameters: Nominal GDP Targeting Rule, Part 1
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Figure 7: Priors and Posteriors for the Parameters: Nominal GDP Targeting Rule, Part 2
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Table 1: Bayesian Estimation Results: Taylor Rule
Parameter
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Type Mean S.D. Mode S.D. Mean HPD Interval
α Beta 0.300 0.050 0.441 0.032 0.429 0.379 0.480
η Normal 0.300 0.090 0.544 0.122 0.492 0.321 0.677
γ Beta 0.300 0.050 0.425 0.055 0.425 0.341 0.528
θ Normal 2.000 0.200 2.451 0.181 2.466 2.172 2.776
φP Gamma 50.000 10.000 56.496 4.007 71.920 65.659 79.107
φytr Normal 0.125 0.200 1.370 0.058 1.320 1.237 1.397
φpitr Normal 1.300 0.300 3.208 0.049 3.134 3.067 3.208
φk Gamma 4.000 1.000 2.472 0.604 2.524 1.544 3.505
ρµtr Beta 0.600 0.150 0.786 0.036 0.784 0.727 0.844
ρa Beta 0.750 0.150 0.878 0.048 0.845 0.771 0.922
ρrtr Beta 0.750 0.150 0.057 0.017 0.061 0.032 0.090
ρx Beta 0.750 0.150 0.130 0.052 0.153 0.071 0.236
ρξ Beta 0.850 0.050 0.803 0.058 0.792 0.704 0.874
ρz Beta 0.750 0.150 0.981 0.013 0.973 0.953 0.995
σx Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.501 0.043 0.513 0.441 0.582
σa Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.235 0.025 0.249 0.205 0.289
σz Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.013 0.002 0.013 0.010 0.017
σµtr Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.159 0.014 0.165 0.141 0.186
σξ Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.028 0.003 0.028 0.024 0.033
Draws 100000.000
Log D. D. 499.949
Acc. Rate Ch. 1 31.1%
Acc. Rate Ch. 2 30.2%
Table 2: Bayesian Estimation Results: Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Parameter
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Type Mean S.D. Mode S.D. Mean HPD Interval
α Beta 0.300 0.050 0.505 0.032 0.495 0.443 0.548
η Normal 0.300 0.090 0.476 0.082 0.469 0.333 0.605
γ Beta 0.300 0.050 0.620 0.038 0.590 0.536 0.643
θ Normal 2.000 0.200 2.519 0.175 2.514 2.216 2.790
φP Gamma 50.000 10.000 99.486 13.107 100.609 78.053 121.429
φfng Gamma 2.000 0.250 4.022 0.137 3.855 3.660 4.022
φk Gamma 4.000 1.000 3.140 0.854 3.434 2.085 4.837
ρµng Beta 0.600 0.150 0.937 0.026 0.928 0.886 0.971
ρa Beta 0.750 0.150 0.807 0.041 0.797 0.732 0.864
ρrng Beta 0.750 0.150 0.072 0.027 0.080 0.035 0.123
ρx Beta 0.750 0.150 0.093 0.043 0.113 0.045 0.181
ρξ Beta 0.850 0.050 0.812 0.045 0.808 0.735 0.883
ρz Beta 0.750 0.150 0.972 0.019 0.962 0.933 0.992
σx Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.473 0.038 0.485 0.425 0.547
σa Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.206 0.022 0.220 0.183 0.254
σz Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.020 0.002 0.021 0.017 0.025
σµng Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.141 0.011 0.145 0.125 0.162
σξ Inverse Gamma 0.010 0.500 0.032 0.003 0.032 0.027 0.037
Draws 100000.000
Log D. D. 643.176
Acc. Rate Ch. 1 30.3%
Acc. Rate Ch. 2 30.3%
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Table 3: Bayesian Model Comparison: Equal Prior Probability Distribution
Model Taylor Rule Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Priors 0.500 0.500
Log Marginal Density 415.963 643.437
Bayes Ratio 1.000 6.175E+98
Posterior Model Probability 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on Laplace approximation
Table 4: Bayesian Model Comparison: Bigger Prior to the Taylor Rule
Model Taylor Rule Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Priors 0.700 0.300
Log Marginal Density 415.963 643.437
Bayes Ratio 1.000 2.646E+98
Posterior Model Probability 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on Laplace approximation
Table 5: Bayesian Model Comparison: Bigger Prior to the Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Model Taylor Rule Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Priors 0.300 0.700
Log Marginal Density 415.963 643.437
Bayes Ratio 1.000 1.441E+99
Posterior Model Probability 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on Laplace approximation
Table 6: Bayesian Model Comparison: Robustness, Equal Prior Probability Distribution
Model Taylor Rule Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Priors 0.500 0.500
Log Marginal Density 415.963 620.809
Bayes Ratio 1.000 9.196E+88
Posterior Model Probability 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on Laplace approximation
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions of Monetary Policy Shocks
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Table 7: Bayesian Model Comparison: Robustness, Bigger Prior to the Taylor Rule
Model Taylor Rule Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Priors 0.700 0.300
Log Marginal Density 499.949 643.176
Bayes Ratio 1.000 6.835E+61
Posterior Model Probability 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on Modified Harmonic Mean Estimator
Table 8: BayesianModel Comparison: Robustness, Bigger Prior to the Nominal GDP Target-
ing Rule
Model Taylor Rule Nominal GDP Targeting Rule
Priors 0.300 0.700
Log Marginal Density 499.949 643.176
Bayes Ratio 1.000 3.721E+62
Posterior Model Probability 0.000 1.000
Note: Based on Modified Harmonic Mean Estimator
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